The spokes model allows addressing non-localized spatial competition between …rms. In a spatial context …rms can personalize their product and price discriminate using location-contingent pricing. Non-localized competition implies that neighbouring e¤ects are not relevant to …rms. This paper analyses spatial price discrimination and location choices in the spokes model. Highly asymmetric location patterns are a very likely outcome: …rms either supply a generally appealing product line or focus on a speci…c niche. Moreover, multiple equilibriums can arise so that the location patterns do not always globally minimize the sum of transportation costs.
Introduction
Price discrimination is a pervasive practice in many markets: it takes place both in highly concentrated markets and also in more competitive ones, in which several …rms are active. Price discrimination also arises in markets strongly characterized by a spatial dimension. A feature of these markets is that competition is not necessarily localized: …rms compete to attract a consumer not only with neighbouring …rms but 1 also with more distant ones. A number of spatial non-localized markets exist where price discrimination takes place; if location is interpreted as the space of characteristics, examples include wines, beers and other alcoholic and soft drinks but also sports equipment, shoes and clothes: in all these markets, IT and marketing innovation are leading to wider and more personalized product lines as …rms try to better match consumers'tastes and extract surplus from consumers in di¤erent segments.
A key strategic decision in these markets is …rms' location and, hence, which segment of the market to be targeted. A very relevant question is whether …rms hit on a speci…c niche of the market or adapt their product line in a way that makes it appealing to a wider segment of consumers, i.e. they supply a "general purpose" product line.
The spokes model (Chen and Riordan, 2007a ) provides a framework to analyse markets characterized by spatial but non-localized competition between …rms: the model naturally extends the Hotelling (1929) approach to the case of several segments and an arbitrary number of …rms by modelling the market as a collection of spokes with a common core. Consumers can buy from whichever …rm they like: if the …rm is not located on their own spoke, however, either the customer or the delivering …rm have to travel through the centre of the market. The spokes model is an important alternative to the circular city model (Salop, 1979) when the neighbouring e¤ects of competition are not particularly relevant.
This paper addresses the question of what segments …rms target by analysing
optimal location in the spokes model. The analysis shows that, in presence of product personalization and price discrimination, the market is likely to be characterized by one …rm whose product line is appealing to consumers in all segments of the market; the remaining competitors target only part of their market segment, focusing on a niche of customers with a strong preference for the varieties supplied by the …rm. In devising the optimal location/product line patterns in the spokes model with price discrimination, it is also found that multiple equilibriums may arise. In that case, one of the outcomes may not globally minimize the sum of transportation costs.
The spokes model has been introduced relatively recently but has already been widely used in the literature. Chen and Riordan (2007a) show that the model captures Chamberlin's original idea of monopolistic competition; moreover, strategic interaction between …rms may lead to price increasing competition. Caminal and Claici (2007) use the model to show how the business stealing e¤ect makes loyalty-rewarding schemes mostly pro-competitive. Chen and Riordan (2007b) show the joint relevance of vertical integration and exclusive dealing in foreclosing the upstream market and increasing downstream prices. Germano (2009) and Germano and Meier (2010) adopt the model to address issues related to the bias of information in media markets. Caminal (2010) analyses the supply of content in di¤erent languages in bilingual contexts. Caminal and Granero (forthcoming) look at the provision of variety by multi-product …rms in the spokes model. Mantovani and Ruiz-Aliseda (2011) analyse cooperative innovation activity of …rms producing complementary products. A unifying characteristic of the recalled literature is the focus on pricing and entry aspects of the interaction between …rms. This paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst addressing the issue of location in the spokes model.
The contribution of this paper is also related to the literature on spatial price discrimination and endogenous location choice. Thisse and Vives (1988) observed that price discrimination in a spatial market is detrimental to …rms'pro…ts: …rms exploit their information on consumers' locations and can match any o¤er made by a rival …rm, unless this is lower than the cost of delivering the good. The classical paper of Lerner and Singer (1937) established that the optimal location con…guration on a line is transport cost minimizing. Lederer and Hurter (1986) endogenize location and establish the existence of price-location equilibriums in a duopolistic spatial framework. They con…rm under quite general assumptions (e.g. two-dimensional space, generic consumers'distribution) that the pro…t maximizing locations chosen by …rms correspond to the ones that minimize the overall transport costs a¤orded by …rms.
However, in presence of multiple equilibriums, the location con…guration may not be globally minimizing the sum of transport costs. MacLeod, Norman and consider the price-location equilibriums of an n-…rms spatial model where the number of …rms is endogenously determined by the …xed costs. Free entry might lead to either a too large or a too small number of varieties. Vogel (2011) analyses spatial price discrimination and the location of heterogeneous …rms in the circle …nding that more e¢ cient …rms are relatively more isolated in equilibrium. Anderson and De Palma (1988) question Lederer and Hurter's results by introducing product heterogeneity: the equilibrium location pattern minimizes the overall transport costs only in presence of homogeneous or very heterogeneous products. Konrad (2000) shows that in presence of a contest for consumers, in which …rms a¤ord sunk costs, the equilibrium locations are not minimizing overall transport costs. Gupta (1992) considers sequen-3 tial entry in a linear city with discriminatory pricing; his results crucially depend on the number of …rms (two or three) entering in the market. As Lederer and Hurter (1986) , Anderson and De Palma (1988) and Konrad (2000) , also this paper shows that price discrimination may not lead to locations pro…les that minimize the overall transport cost: the market features and structure (number of …rms and segments), however, determine the possible rise of ine¢ ciency in the spokes model. Di¤erently from MacLeod, Norman and Thisse (1988) and Vogel (2011) our focus is on location and targeting of di¤erent segments of the market rather than on issues related to entry and the heterogeneity of …rms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the spokes model and the game played by price discriminating …rms. Section 3 characterizes the outcomes of competition. Section 4 discusses and provides an interpretation of the results. Section 5 concludes.
The spokes model with price discrimination
The market is constituted of a set of spokes with a common core. There is a …xed number of spokes N and each spoke has constant length, normalized to l s = 1=2, s = 1:::N . Customers are distributed along each spoke according to a uniform distribution function f (x s ) so that on each spoke there are 2 N customers 1 . Each customer has a valuation v for the good and can demand at most one unit of it; v is assumed to be high enough so that the market is covered.
Every …rm i is assigned a spoke i and can choose a location along this spoke, with i = 1:::n. Consistently with Chen and Riordan (2007a) it is assumed that the number of …rms does not exceed the number of spokes, i.e. n N . The good supplied is homogeneous at the source but can be adapted to consumers'tastes as the …rms deliver the product and bear the cost of the distance that separates them from the consumers. A generic …rm i can locate on any point of its spoke l i which is denoted by y i ; so that y i 2 [0; 1=2]. 1 The uniform distribution is assumed for expositional convenience; many of the results, however, are qualitatively una¤ected if any non degenerate distribution function is employed. The intuition is the following: in computing both …rms' pro…ts and social cost functions, each location has to be considered independently; this is due to the assumption of price discrimination. Local competition implies that the shape of the distribution function a¤ects the optimal location but does not a¤ect the properties of it. Firms price discriminate customers according to their location over the spokes:
as they deliver the product and so they know their taste. A generic customer located on a spoke s is identi…ed by x: consumers in x = 0 are located at the extreme of the considered spoke while consumers at x = 1=2 are exactly at the centre of the market.
The location of each consumer is fully identi…ed by x s . The distance between …rm i, located at y i and the customer located at x s is denoted as d(y i ; x s ) and it is also spoke-dependent. In particular, if the …rm and the customer are both located on the i-th spoke, then distance can be written as:
If the …rm is located on a di¤erent spoke with respect to customer x s the distance is:
as the …rms always have to travel towards the centre of the market to deliver the product to consumers located over di¤erent segments.
The unit transportation cost is denoted by t captures the disutility of adapting the good to consumers tastes and it is identical for all …rms and customers. Each …rm produces the good at a unit and marginal cost c 2 .
2 The assumption of cost homogeneity is convenient to simplify the presentation of the main 5
The timing of the game played by the n N …rms:
1. Nature assigns to each of the n …rms a spoke i.
2. Location stage: each …rm chooses its location y i 2 [ 0; 1=2 ] on its spoke;
3. Pricing stage: given the location y i , the …rm chooses the price schedule p i (x s jy i ).
The game is solved by backward induction to identify strategies which are undominated and constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium. The following analysis closely parallels Lederer and Hurter (1986) : analogies and di¤erences will be highlighted.
Results

The pricing stage
Given the selected location y i over their spoke, …rms choose a price schedule: p i (x s jy i ) 8i = 1:::n. Customers at location x s choose to buy from the …rm providing the good at the lowest price 3 . Naming X as the set of locations over all the N spokes, from the point of view of …rm i the market X can be partitioned as follows:
The set D i is the segment of demand served by the i-th …rm individually while D S is shared with one or more rival …rms. A cost-advantage (or e¢ cient) sharing rule completes the de…nition of …rm i's demand schedule, i.e. a function r(y i ; p i ; y i ; p i ; x) that in case of a price tie allocates the demand to the lowest net cost producer. The pro…t function of …rm i can then be written as:
arguments; however, the results can be generalized to a heterogeneous distribution of production costs. 3 When no ambiguity is possible, the notation x is used from now on instead of xs.
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Consistently with Lederer and Hurter (1986) , weakly dominated strategies and, hence, possible equilibriums in which weakly dominated strategies are played are ruled out.
This implies:
and:
Proposition 1 characterizes the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing stage and it is a straight generalization of Lederer-Hurter (1986) to the spokes model and n …rms:
Proposition 1 Given the set of locations y = (y 1 ; :::; y i ; :::; y n ), the unique equilibrium of the pricing stage is:
The equilibrium price schedule is closely related to the cost structure. As a consequence of undercutting, the price at a generic location x is either the …rm's cost of delivering the product or, if the …rm is the lowest cost provider, the cost of the …rm that is the second most e¢ cient in delivering the good. This result constitutes the foundation of the ensuing analysis of …rms'location decisions.
The location stage
The equilibrium price schedule identi…ed by (1) implies that the pro…t function for …rm i can be written as:
The Nash equilibrium of the location stage is de…ned as:
Consistently with Chen and Riordan (2007a), two cases are analyzed: if n = N there are as many …rms as spokes; if n < N some spokes are not assigned to any …rm. 
The n = N case
The number of …rms on the market equals the number of spokes. In this context, social cost is de…ned as the sum of transport costs borne by …rms to supply the good to all customers on the market in a cost minimizing way. Given a vector of locations y = (y 1 ; :::; y i ; :::y n ), social cost is then:
Social cost is a continuous function of y over the support X. The social cost function and the pro…ts of a generic …rm are closely related:
The pro…ts of …rm i consist of two elements. The …rst is positive and it is obtained in the region D i where the …rm is the lowest cost provider: in that region, by de…nition, the …rm concurs to the social cost. According to (1) the pro…ts on D i are the di¤er-ential between the …rm's delivery cost and the second most e¢ cient …rm's cost. The other part is constituted by the rest of the market X on which the …rm is not the lowest cost provider and, as such, does not concur to the social cost; however, it does not make any pro…t either. Hence, pro…ts consist of the di¤erence, on all the market X, between the lowest cost rival and the social cost, which in region D i corresponds to the …rm's cost while outside D i it corresponds to the cost of the most e¢ cient rival. Relation (2) leads to: ; 8i = 1:::n is an equilibrium if n 3.
(ii) the symmetric location con…guration y i = The reason is that when the number of spokes (and, consequently, competitors) is relatively small a move towards the centre is not pro…table; however, as the number of spokes increases (n 6), the gains of a small deviation are multiplied su¢ ciently to compensate for the inframarginal losses that the …rm makes on its captive market.
As the market becomes competitive enough (n 4), an asymmetric location con…g-uration is also an equilibrium. One …rm occupies the central location of the market while other …rms locate at one third of their spoke. Hence, if the market features four or …ve …rms both location con…gurations constitute an equilibrium. The equilibriums can be compared in terms of pro…ts: in a symmetric con…guration …rms get Although the two equilibrium con…gurations are equally likely in a simultaneous setting, if location choice was sequential the …rst …rm would occupy the centre. The case of n = 4; 5 …rms is also interesting for the implications of multiplicity on social cost. Social cost in the symmetric con…guration is SC (1986) also showed through an example how equilibrium location chosen by two …rms in the space may not be globally minimizing social cost; our example shows that an equilibrium which does not minimize globally social cost can take place even when competition takes place in one-dimension as in the spokes model. Finally, when the number of …rms and spokes is high enough, the asymmetric con…guration is the only equilibrium.
The n < N case
Suppose there are more market segments than …rms, i.e. the number of …rms n in the market is smaller than the number of spokes N . The unique pure strategy equilibrium of the pricing stage in Proposition 1 still applies: on the spokes occupied by one …rm, the lowest cost …rm serves consumers, pricing at the cost of the second most e¢ cient competitor; on spokes that are not occupied by any …rm, a …rm with a cost advantage in delivering would capture all the customers by pricing at the most e¢ cient rival's delivered cost; if there is not a most e¢ cient …rm, all competitors price equally at the common delivered cost. The equilibrium price schedules are then given by (1).
Turning to the location stage, …rst it can be ruled out that any symmetric location con…guration constitutes an equilibrium. Then, the equilibrium is characterized. The main di¤erence with the previous case (n = N ) is the presence of empty spokes. The consumers on parts of the market not served by a …rm do not have a strongly favourite brand available on the market (or a local supplier in the geographical interpretation); hence, all …rms on the market are on even grounds when trying to attract consumers from the empty segments to their product. This feature impacts on the equilibrium as no symmetric con…guration is now possible.
Lemma 1 In the spokes model with price discrimination and n < N …rms a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium of the location stage does not exist.
The intuition for this result is the following. Suppose …rst that the centre, where all the spokes join, is the symmetric equilibrium location of all …rms. In that case, …rms obtain no pro…t and they have a unilateral incentive to deviate to a location internal to their own spokes. However, if the location equilibrium is a vector of points internal to the spokes, then a …rm has an incentive to move towards the centre to undercut all competitors and serve a larger share of the market, comprising the empty spokes. A symmetric location, then, can not be an equilibrium.
The next proposition characterizes the equilibrium con…guration in the n < N case.
Proposition 4
In the spokes model with price discrimination and n < N …rms the equilibrium location con…guration is:
and price schedules are given by (1) . This location con…guration minimizes the social cost.
The asymmetric con…guration of Proposition 3 is also an equilibrium in case not all spokes are occupied, n < N . The intuition for the result is also similar to the previous case: no more than one …rm can locate in the centre of the market, otherwise all …rms would get zero pro…ts. So only one …rm locates in the centre and serves consumers on all the segments of the market. The remaining …rms optimally specialize in serving only part of their own spokes. Optimal locations are independent of the number of …rms and the number of spokes. Social cost is also minimized when one …rm locates at the centre of the market: the total transport costs decrease with the …rm location and the centre provides the limit. All other …rms choose a location in the interior of their spokes and the cost minimising one coincides with the pro…t maximizing,
Discussion
One result stands out in both of the cases we analysed (n = N and n < N ): highly asymmetric location patterns arise as a result of price discrimination in the spokes model. Notice that the result arises in a context in which …rms are homogeneous and the spatial structure is perfectly symmetric. The conclusion is that price discriminating …rms that face non-localized competition in a segmented market are likely to locate so that one …rm occupies the central spot and serves consumers on all segments of the market. The other …rms narrow their focus to their own segment.
MacLeod, Norman and Thisse (1988) propose an interpretation for spatial price discrimination in the characteristics space. In standard spatial models transportation costs can be thought as a measure of disutility and location is a product characteristic; in presence of price discrimination, instead, the situation can be interpreted as 
A Appendix Proof of Proposition 1
The set of (weakly) undominated prices is:
For a given y, given the sharing rule r …rm i can match any o¤er of a rival …rm j as long as it is the most e¢ cient at serving customer x.
Consider …rm i. First the claim for which, in equilibrium, the price p i (xjy) is identical for all …rms i = 1:::n. Having de…ned above: D S i = fx 2 D S jr i = 1g the subset of the market region D S in which …rm i has a cost advantage. Then, assuming ad absurdum that:
then …rm i loses all the customers located in x. On the other hand, proceeding again ad absurdum:
then …rm i can raise its price and increase the pro…t margin on customers located at x. Then, the only possibility left is that: p i (xjy) = p j (xjy). The reasoning can be repeated for all j 6 = i and for all i = 1:::n.
Second, p i (xjy) = max fc + td(y i ; x); minfc + td(y i ; x)gg. Suppose instead that, for x 2 D S i , the following holds:
p i (xjy) max fc + td(y i ; x); minfc + td(y i ; x)gg = > 0
In that case, the second most e¢ cient …rm, say j, can choose the price p j (xjy) = p i and for su¢ ciently small raise its pro…t, which contradicts the de…nition of equilibrium. The reasoning can be repeated for all j 6 = i, all i = 1:::n.
Analogous reasoning allows to establish the result for the subsets of X over which r i = r and r i = 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
If y = (y 1 ; ::; y i ; ::; y n ) is a vector of equilibrium locations, then:
i (y i ; p i ; y i ; p i ) i (y i ; p i ; y i ; p i ) 8y i 2 X 8i = 1:::n which, by (2), can be written as: 
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove point (i) and (ii) consider …rst outcomes in which …rms choose a location internal to their spoke, y i 2 [0; In case the deviation is pro…table, the expression:
would have a positive sign. This happens if:
implying there is a possible deviation if and only if n 3. Hence, the vector
, 8k 6 = i is an equilibrium only if n 4.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose …rst that the vector of equilibrium locations is y = ( 
where D i , the market served by …rm i, is now constituted by consumers on its own spoke with a location such that i faces the lowest cost in delivering to them, i.e.
2 ]g. This implies that …rm i makes a positive mark-up on the market served and has a strictly positive pro…t:
This proves that …rms have a unilateral incentive to deviate, so the location pro…le can not be a Nash equilibrium. Then y = ( 
Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose …rst that the equilibrium con…guration is y i = 1 2 for all …rms i; in this case, all …rms obtain zero pro…ts.This implies that only one …rm chooses y i = where:
x ik = 1 y i + y j 2 represents the consumer on j-th spoke which is indi¤erent between …rm j and …rm i.
Were the maximization unconstrained, …rm i had an incentive to choose a location y i > . Given the constraints, the optimal choice is then y i = 1 2 ; the problem for …rm j has an internal solution given by y j = 1 6 ; 8j 6 = i: Q.E.D.
